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Abstract. We consider two-party quantum protocols starting with a transmission of some random
BB84 qubits followed by classical messages. We show a general “compiler” improving the security
of such protocols: if the original protocol is secure against an “almost honest” adversary, then the
compiled protocol is secure against an arbitrary computationally bounded (quantum) adversary.
The compilation preserves the number of qubits sent and the number of rounds up to a constant
factor. The compiler also preserves security in the bounded-quantum-storage model (BQSM), so
if the original protocol was BQSM-secure, the compiled protocol can only be broken by an adver-
sary who has large quantum memory and large computing power. This is in contrast to known
BQSM-secure protocols, where security breaks down completely if the adversary has larger quan-
tum memory than expected. We show how our technique can be applied to quantum identification
and oblivious transfer protocols.
1 Introduction
We consider two-party quantum protocols for mutually distrusting players Alice and Bob. Such
protocols typically start by Alice sending n random BB84 qubits to Bob who is supposed to
measure them. Then some classical exchange of messages follows. Several protocols following
this pattern have been proposed, implementing Oblivious Transfer (OT), Commitment, and
Password-Based Identification [BBCS91,DFSS08,DFR+07,DFSS07].
In more details, the first step of the protocol consists of Alice choosing random binary strings
x = x1, ..., xn and θ = θ1, ..., θn. She then prepares n particles where xi is encoded in the state
of the i’th particle using basis θi. Bob chooses a basis string θˆ = θˆ1, .., θˆn and measures the i’th
particle in basis θˆi. If Bob plays honestly, he learns xi whenever θˆi = θi and else gets a random
independent result.
Protocols of the form we consider here are typically unconditionally secure against cheating
by Alice, but can (in their basic form) be broken easily by Bob, if he does not measure the qubits
immediately. This is because the protocol typically asks Alice to reveal θ at a later stage, and
Bob can then measure the qubits with θˆ = θ and learn more information than he was supposed
to.
In this paper, we show a general “compiler” that can be used to improve security against
such an attack. We assume that the original protocol implements some two-party functionality F
with statistical security against Bob if he is benign, meaning that he treats the qubits “almost
honestly”, a notion we make more precise below. Then we show that the compiled protocol
also implements F , but now with security against any computationally bounded (quantum)
Bob (note that we cannot in general obtain unconditional security against both Alice and Bob,
not even using quantum communication [Lo97]). The compiled protocol preserves unconditional
security against Alice and has the same number of transmitted qubits and rounds as the original
one up to a constant factor.
By benign behavior of Bob, we mean that after having received the qubits, two conditions
are satisfied: First, Bob’s quantum storage is essentially of size zero (note that it would be
exactly zero if he had measured the qubits). Second, there exists a basis string θˆ such that the
uncertainty about x is essentially as it would be if Bob had really measured in bases θˆ, namely
1 bit for every position where θˆ differs from θ.
Thus, with our compiler, one can build a protocol for any two-party functionality by de-
signing a protocol that only has to be secure if Bob is benign. We note that proofs for known
protocols typically go through under this assumption. For instance, our compiler can easily be
applied to the quantum identification protocols of [DFSS07] and the OT protocol of [BBCS91].
The compiler is based on a computational assumption; namely we assume the existence
of a classical commitment scheme with some special properties, similar to the commitment
schemes used in [DFS04] but with an additional extraction property, secure against a quantum
adversary. A good candidate is the cryptosystem of Regev [Reg05]. For efficiency, we use a
common reference string which allows us to use Regev’s scheme in a simple way and, since it
is relatively efficient, we get a protocol that is potentially practical. It is possible to generate
the reference string from scratch, but this requires a more complicated non-constant round
protocol [DL09].
The reader may ask whether it is really interesting to improve the security of quantum
protocols for classical tasks such as identification or OT using a computational assumption.
Perhaps it would be a more practical approach to use the same assumption to build classical
protocols for the same tasks, secure against quantum attacks? To answer this, it is important
to point out that our compiler also preserves security in the bounded-quantum-storage model
(BQSM) [DFSS05], and this feature allows us to get security properties that classical protocols
cannot achieve. In the BQSM, one assumes that Bob can only keep in his quantum memory a
limited number of qubits received from Alice. With current state of the art, it is much easier
to transmit and measure qubits than it is to store them for a non-negligible time, suggesting
that the BQSM and the subsequently proposed noisy-quantum-storage model [WST08] are
reasonable. On the other hand, if the assumption fails and the adversary can perfectly store all
qubits sent, the known protocols can be easily broken. In contrast, by applying our compiler,
one obtains new protocols where the adversary must have large quantum storage and large
computing power to break the protocol.4 5
The basic technique we use to construct the compiler was already suggested in connection
with the first quantum OT protocol from [BBCS91]: we try to force Bob to measure by asking
him to commit (using a classical scheme) to all his basis choices and measurement results, and
open some of them later. While classical intuition suggests that the commitments should force
Bob to measure (almost) all the qubits, it has proved very tricky to show that the approach re-
ally works against a quantum adversary. In fact, it was previously very unclear what exactly the
commit-and-open approach forces Bob to do. Although some partial results for OT have been
shown [Yao95,CDMS04], the original OT protocol from [BBCS91] has never been proved secure
for a concrete unconditionally hiding commitment scheme – which is needed to maintain uncon-
ditional security against Alice. In this paper, we develop new quantum information-theoretic
tools (that may be of independent interest) to characterize what commit-and-open achieves in
general, namely it forces Bob to be benign. This property allows us to apply the compiler to
any two-party functionality and in particular to show that the OT from [BBCS91] is indeed
secure when using an appropriate commitment scheme.
4 For the case of identification[DFSS07], the compiled protocol is not only secure against adversaries trying to
impersonate Alice or Bob, but can also be made secure against man-in-the-middle attacks, where again the
adversary must have large quantum storage and large computing power to break the protocol.
5 One may try to achieve the same security by combining one of the previous BQSM secure protocols with a
computationally secure classical protocol, but it is not clear that this technique will work for all functional-
ities, and it would require independent key material for the two instances. For the case of password-based
identification it would require users to have two passwords.
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2 Preliminaries
We assume the reader to be familiar with the basic notation and concepts of quantum infor-
mation processing [NC00]. In this paper, the computational or + -basis is defined by the pair
{|0〉, |1〉} (also written as {|0〉+, |1〉+}). The pair {|0〉×, |1〉×} denotes the diagonal or ×-basis,
where |0〉× = (|0〉+ |1〉)/
√
2 and |1〉× = (|0〉 − |1〉)/
√
2. We write |x〉θ = |x1〉θ1 ⊗· · ·⊗ |xn〉θn for
the n-qubit state where string x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n is encoded in bases θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈
{+,×}n. For S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size s, we denote by S¯ := {1, . . . , n}\S the complement of S
and define x|S ∈ {0, 1}s and θ|S ∈ {+,×}s to be the restrictions (xi)i∈S and (θi)i∈S , respec-
tively. For two strings x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, we define the Hamming distance between x and y as
dH(x, y) := |{i : xi 6= yi}|.
We use upper case letters for the random variables in the proofs that describe the respective
values in the protocol. Given a bipartite quantum state ρXE , we say that X is classical if ρXE
is of the form ρXE =
∑
x∈X PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE for a probability distribution PX over a finite set
X , i.e. the state of the quantum register E depends on the classical random variable X in the
sense that E is in state ρxE exactly if X = x. This naturally extends to states with two or more
classical registers.
For a state ρXE as above, X is independent of register E if ρXE = ρX ⊗ ρE, where ρX =∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| and ρE =
∑
x PX(x)ρ
x
E . We also need to express that a random variable X is
independent of a quantum state E when given a random variable Y . Independence means that
when given Y , the state E gives no additional information on X. Formally, adopting the notion
introduced in [DFSS07], we require that ρXY E equals ρX↔Y↔E, where the latter is defined as
ρX↔Y↔E :=
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρyE ,
where ρyE :=
∑
x PX|Y (x|y)ρx,yE . In other words, ρXY E = ρX↔Y↔E precisely if ρx,yE = ρyE for all
x and y.
Full (conditional) independence is often too strong a requirement, and it usually suffices to
be “close” to such a situation. Closeness of two states ρ and σ is measured in terms of their
trace distance δ(ρ, σ) = 12 tr(|ρ− σ|), where for any operator A, |A| is defined as |A| :=
√
AA†.
A quantum algorithm consists of a family {Cn}n∈N of quantum circuits and is said to run in
polynomial time, if the number of gates of Cn is polynomial in n. Two families of quantum states
{ρn}n∈N and {σn}n∈N are called quantum-computationally indistinguishable, denoted ρ
q≈ σ, if
any polynomial-time quantum algorithm has negligible advantage (in n) of distinguishing ρn
from σn. Analogously, we call them statistically indistinguishable, ρ
s≈ σ, if their trace distance
δ(ρn, σn) is negligible in n.
Definition 2.1 (Min-Entropy). The min-entropy of a random variable X with probability
distribution PX is defined as H∞(X) := − log
(
maxx PX(x)
)
.
Definition 2.2 (Max-Entropy). The max-entropy of a density matrix ρ is defined as H0(ρ) :=
log
(
rank(ρ)
)
.
We will make use of the following properties of a pure state that can be written as a “small
superposition” of basis vectors.
Lemma 2.3. Let |ϕAE〉 ∈ HA ⊗HE be of the form |ϕAE〉 =
∑
i∈J αi|i〉|ϕiE〉, where {|i〉}i∈I is
a basis of HA and J ⊆ I. Then, the following holds.
1. Let ρ˜AE =
∑
i∈J |αi|2|i〉〈i| ⊗ |ϕiE〉〈ϕiE |, and let W and W˜ be the outcome of measuring A of
|ϕAE〉 respectively of ρ˜AE in some basis {|w〉}w∈W . Then,6
H∞(W ) ≥ H∞(W˜ )− log |J | .
6 Using Renner’s definition for conditional min-entropy [Ren05], one can actually show that H∞(W |E) ≥
H∞(W˜ |E)− log |J |.
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2. The reduced density matrix ρE = trA(|ϕAE〉〈ϕAE |) has max-entropy
H0(ρE) ≤ log |J | .
Proof. For 1., we may understand ρ˜AE as being in state |i〉|ϕiE〉 with probability |αi|2, so that
we easily see that
PW˜ (w) =
∑
i∈J
|αi|2|〈w|i〉|2 =
∑
i∈J
|αi|2|〈w|i〉|2 ·
∑
i∈J
12 · 1|J |
≥
∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈J
αi〈w|i〉
∣∣∣∣
2
· 1|J | =
∣∣∣∣〈w|
∑
i∈J
αi|i〉
∣∣∣∣
2
· 1|J | = PW (w) ·
1
|J | ,
where the inequality is Cauchy-Schwartz. This proves 1.
For 2., note that ρE = trA(|ϕAE〉〈ϕAE |) =
∑
i∈J |αi|2|ϕiE〉〈ϕiE |. The claim follows immedi-
ately from the sub-additivity of the rank:
rank(ρE) ≤
∑
i∈J
rank(|αi|2
∣∣ϕiE〉〈ϕiE∣∣) ≤∑
i∈J
1 = |J | ,
where we use that the |ϕiE〉〈ϕiE |’s have rank at most 1. ⊓⊔
3 Definition of Security
In order to define security of our two-party protocols, we follow the framework put forward by
Fehr and Schaffner in [FS09]. We are interested in quantum protocols that implement classical
functionalities such as oblivious transfer. Such primitives are often used as building blocks in
more complicated classical (multi-party) protocols which implement advanced tasks. Therefore,
it is natural to restrict our focus on quantum protocols that run in a classical environment
and have classical in- and outputs. A two-party quantum protocol Π = (Am,Bm) consists of
an infinite family of interactive quantum circuits for players Alice and Bob indexed by the
security parameter m (in our case, m will also be the number of qubits transmitted). To ease
notation, we often leave the dependence on m implicit. A classical non-reactive two-party ideal
functionality F is given by a conditional probability distribution PF(U,V )|UV , inducing a pair of
random variables (X,Y ) = F(U, V ) for every joint distribution of U and V . The definition of
correctness of a protocol is straightforward.
Definition 3.1 (Correctness). A protocol Π = (A,B) correctly implements an ideal classical
functionality F , if for every distribution of the input values U and V , the resulting common
output satisfies
(U, V, (X,Y ))
s≈ (U, V,F(U, V )) .
Let us denote by outF
Aˆ,Bˆ
the joint output7 of the “ideal-life” protocol, where Alice and Bob
forward their inputs to F and output whatever they obtain from F . And we write outF
Aˆ,Bˆ′
for
the joint output of the execution of this protocol with a dishonest Bob with strategy Bˆ′ (and
similarly for a dishonest Alice). Note that Bob’s possibilities in the ideal world are very limited:
he can produce some classical input V for F from his input quantum state V ′, and then he can
prepare and output a quantum state Y ′ which might depend on F ’s classical reply Y .
7 We use a slightly different notation here than in [FS09]. Our notation outF
Aˆ,Bˆ
does not mention the name of
the input registers and corresponds to (F
Aˆ,Bˆ)ρUV in [FS09].
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3.1 Information-Theoretic Security
We define information-theoretic security using the real/ideal-world paradigm, which requires
that by attacking a protocol in the real world the dishonest party cannot achieve (significantly)
more than when attacking the corresponding functionality in the ideal world. To be consistent
with the framework used in [FS09], we restrict the joint input state, consisting of a classical
input to the honest party and a possibly quantum input to the dishonest party, to a special
form: in case of a dishonest Bob (and correspondingly for a dishonest Alice), we require that
Bob’s input consists of a classical part Z and a quantum part V ′, such that the joint state ρUZV ′
satisfies ρUZV ′ = ρU↔Z↔V ′ , i.e., that V
′ is correlated with Alice’s input only via the classical Z.
We call a joint input state of that form (respectively of the form ρU ′ZV = ρU ′↔Z↔V in case of
dishonest Alice) a legitimate input state. As shown in [FS09], this restriction on the input state
leads to a meaningful security definition with a composition theorem that guarantees sequential
composition within classical outer protocols. Furthermore, the results of Section 4 also hold
when quantifying over all (possibly non-legitimate) joint input states.
Definition 3.2 (Unconditional security against dishonest Alice). A protocol Π = (A,B)
implements an ideal classical functionality F unconditionally securely against dishonest Alice,
if for any real-world adversary A′ there exists an ideal-world adversary Aˆ′ such that for any
legitimate input state, it holds that the outputs in the real and ideal world are statistically
indistinguishable, i.e.
outΠ
A′,B
s≈ outF
Aˆ′,Bˆ
.
Definition 3.3 (Unconditional security against dishonest Bob). A protocol Π = (A,B)
implements an ideal classical functionality F unconditionally securely against dishonest Bob,
if for any real-world adversary B′ there exists an ideal-world adversary Bˆ′ such that for any
legitimate input state, it holds that the outputs in the real and ideal world are statistically
indistinguishable, i.e.
outΠ
A,B′
s≈ outF
Aˆ,Bˆ′
.
It has been shown in Theorem 5.1 in [FS09] that protocols fulfilling the above definitions
compose sequentially as follows. For a classical real-life protocol Σ which makes at most k oracle
calls to functionalities F1, . . . ,Fk, it is guaranteed that whatever output Σ produces, the output
produced when the oracle calls are replaced by ε-secure protocols is at distance at most O(kε).
Notice that in the definitions above, we do not require the running time of ideal-world ad-
versaries to be polynomial whenever the real-life adversaries run in polynomial time. This way
of defining unconditional security can lead to the (unwanted) effect that unconditional security
does not necessarily imply computational security. However, for the security of the construc-
tion proposed in this paper, efficient ideal-life adversaries can be guaranteed, as discussed in
Section 5.3.
3.2 Computational Security in the CRS Model
One can define security against a computationally bounded dishonest Bob analogously to
information-theoretic security with the two differences that the input given to the parties has
to be sampled by an efficient quantum algorithm and that the output states should be compu-
tationally indistinguishable.
In the common-reference-string (CRS) model, all participants in the real-life protocol ΠA,B
have access to a classical public string ω which is chosen before any interaction starts according
to a distribution only depending on the security parameter. On the other hand, the participants
in the “ideal-life” protocol F
Aˆ,Bˆ
interacting only with the ideal functionality do not make use
of the string ω. Hence, an ideal-world adversary Bˆ′, that operates by simulating the real world
to the adversary B′, is free to choose ω in any way he wishes.
5
In order to define computational security against a dishonest Bob in the CRS model, we
consider a polynomial-size quantum circuit, called input sampler, which takes as input the
security parameter m and the CRS ω (chosen according to its distribution) and produces the
input state ρUZV ′ ; U is Alice’s classical input to the protocol, and Z and V
′ denote the respective
classical and quantum information given to dishonest Bob. We call the input sampler legitimate
if ρUZV ′ = ρU↔Z↔V ′ .
In the following and throughout the article, we let Bpoly be the family of all polynomial-time
quantum strategies for dishonest Bob B′.
Definition 3.4 (Computational security against dishonest Bob). A protocol Π = (A,B)
implements an ideal classical functionality F computationally securely against dishonest Bob, if
for any real-world adversary B′ ∈ Bpoly who has access to the common reference string ω, there
exists an ideal-world adversary Bˆ′ ∈ Bpoly not using ω such that for any efficient legitimate
input sampler, it holds that the outputs in the real and ideal world are q-indistinguishable, i.e.
outΠA,B′
q≈ outF
Aˆ,Bˆ′
.
In Appendix A, we show that also the computational security definition, as given here, allows
for (sequential) composition of quantum protocols into classical outer protocols.
4 Improving the Security via Commit-and-Open
4.1 Security against Benign Bob
In this paper, we consider quantum two-party protocols that follow a particular but very typical
construction design. These protocols consist of two phases, called preparation and post-processing
phase, and are as specified in Figure 1. We call a protocol that follows this construction design
a BB84-type protocol.
Protocol Π
Preparation: A chooses x ∈R {0, 1}
n and θ ∈R {+,×}
n and sends |x〉
θ
to B, and B chooses θˆ ∈R {+,×}
n
and obtains xˆ ∈ {0, 1}n by measuring |x〉θ in basis θˆ.
Post-processing: Arbitrary classical communication and local computations.
Fig. 1. Generic BB84-type quantum protocol Π .
The following definition captures information-theoretic security against a somewhat mildly
dishonest Bob who we call a benign (dishonest) Bob. Such a dishonest Bob is benign in that,
in the preparation phase, he does not deviate too much from what he is supposed to do; in the
post-processing phase though, he may be arbitrarily dishonest.
To make this description formal, we fix an arbitrary choice of θ and an arbitrary value for the
classical information, z, which B′ may obtain as a result of the preparation phase (i.e. z = (θˆ, xˆ)
in case B′ is actually honest). Let X denote the random variable describing the bit-string x,
where we understand the distribution PX of X to be conditioned on the fixed values of θ and z.
Furthermore, let ρE be the state of B
′’s quantum register E after the preparation phase. Note
that, still with fixed θ and z, ρE is of the form ρE =
∑
x PX(x)ρ
x
E , where ρ
x
E is the state of B
′’s
quantum register in case X takes on the value x. In general, the ρxE’s may be mixed, but we can
think of them as being reduced pure states: ρxE = trR(|ψxER〉〈ψxER|) for a suitable register R and
pure states |ψxER〉; we then call the state ρER =
∑
x PX(x)|ψxER〉〈ψxER| a pointwise purification
(with respect to X) of ρE.
6
Obviously, in case B′ is honest, Xi is fully random whenever θi 6= θˆi, so that H∞
(
X|I
∣∣X|I¯ =
x|I¯
)
= dH
(
θ|I , θˆ|I
)
for every I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and every x|I , and B′ does not store any non-trivial
quantum state so that R is “empty” and H0(ρER) = H0(ρE) = 0. A benign Bob B
′ is now
specified to behave close-to-honestly in the preparation phase: he produces an auxiliary output
θˆ after the preparation phase, and given this output, we are in a certain sense close to the ideal
situation where Bob really measured in basis θˆ as far as the values of H∞
(
X|I
∣∣X|I¯ = x|I¯) and
H0(ρER) are concerned.
8 We now make this precise:
Definition 4.1 (Unconditional security against benign Bob). A BB84-type quantum pro-
tocol Π securely implements F against a β-benign Bob for some parameter β ≥ 0, if it securely
implements F according to Definition 3.3, with the following two modifications:
1. The quantification is over all B′ with the following property: after the preparation phase B′
either aborts, or else produces an auxiliary output θˆ ∈ {+,×}n. Moreover, the joint state
of A,B′ (after θˆ has been output) is statistically indistinguishable from a state for which it
holds that for any fixed values of θ, θˆ and z, for any subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, and for any x|I¯
H∞
(
X|I
∣∣X|I¯ = x|I¯) ≥ dH(θ|I , θˆ|I)− βn and H0(ρER) ≤ βn (1)
where ρER is the pointwise purification of ρE with respect to X.
2. Bˆ′’s running-time is polynomial in the running-time of B′.
4.2 From Benign to Computational Security
We show a generic compiler which transforms any BB84-type protocol into a new quantum
protocol for the same task. The compiler achieves that if the original protocol is unconditionally
secure against dishonest Alice and unconditionally secure against benign Bob, then the compiled
protocol is still unconditionally secure against dishonest Alice and it is computationally secure
against arbitrary dishonest Bob.
The idea behind the construction of the compiler is to incorporate a commitment scheme
and force Bob to behave benignly by means of a commit-and-open procedure. Figure 2 shows the
compilation of an arbitrary BB84-type protocol Π. The quantum communication is increased
from n to m = n/(1 − α) qubits, where 0 < α < 1 is some additional parameter that can be
arbitrarily chosen. The compiled protocol also requires 3 more rounds of interaction.
Protocol Cα(Π)
Preparation: A chooses x ∈R {0, 1}
m and θ ∈R {+,×}
m and sends |x〉
θ
to B. Then, B chooses θˆ ∈R {+,×}
m
and obtains xˆ ∈ {0, 1}m by measuring |x〉θ in basis θˆ.
Verification: 1. B commits to θˆ and xˆ position-wise: ci : = Commit
`
(θˆi, xˆi), ri
´
with randomness ri for
i = 1, . . . ,m. He sends the commitments to A.
2. A sends a random test subset T ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} of size αm. B opens ci for all i ∈ T , and A checks
that the openings were correct and that xi = xˆi whenever θi = θˆi. If all tests are passed, A accepts,
otherwise, she rejects and aborts.
3. The tested positions are discarded by both parties: A and B restrict x and θ, respectively θˆ and xˆ,
to i ∈ T¯ .
Post-processing: As in Π (with x, θ, xˆ and θˆ restricted to the positions i ∈ T¯ ).
Fig. 2. Compiled protocol Cα(Π).
8 The reason why we consider the pointwise purification of ρE is to prevent Bob from artificially blowing up
H0(ρER) by locally generating a large mixture or storing an unrelated mixed input state.
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We need to specify what kind of commitment scheme to use. In order to preserve uncon-
ditional security against dishonest Alice, the commitment scheme needs to be unconditionally
hiding, and so can at best be computationally binding. However, for a plain computation-
ally binding commitment scheme, we do not know how to reduce the computational security
of Cα(Π) against dishonest Bob to the computational binding property of the commitment
scheme.9 Therefore, we use a commitment scheme with additional properties: we require a
keyed commitment scheme Commitpk, where the corresponding public key pk is generated by
one of two possible key-generation algorithms: GH or GB. For a key pkH generated by GH, the
commitment scheme CommitpkH is unconditionally hiding, whereas the other generator, GB, actu-
ally produces a key pair (pkB, sk), so that the secret key sk allows to efficiently extract m from
CommitpkB(m, r), and as such CommitpkB is unconditionally binding. Furthermore, we require pkH
and pkB to be computationally indistinguishable, even against quantum attacks. We call such a
commitment scheme a dual-mode commitment scheme.10 As a candidate for implementing such
a system, we propose the public-key encryption scheme of Regev [Reg05], which is based on
a worst-case lattice assumption and is not known to be breakable even by (efficient) quantum
algorithms. Regev does not explicitly state that the scheme has the property we need, but this is
implicit in his proof that the underlying computational assumption implies semantic security.11
For simplicity and efficiency, we consider the common-reference-string model, and we assume
the key pkB for the commitment scheme, generated according to GB, to be contained in the CRS.
We sketch in Section 5.4 how to avoid the CRS model, at the cost of a non constant-round
construction where the parties generate the CRS jointly by means of a coin-tossing protocol
(see [DL09] for details).
We sometimes write CαpkH(Π) for the compiled protocol Cα(Π) to stress that a key pkH
produced by GH is used for the dual-mode commitment scheme, and we write CαpkB(Π) when a
key pkB produced by GB is used instead.
Theorem 4.2. Let Π be a BB84-type protocol, unconditionally secure against dishonest Alice
and against β-benign Bob for some constant β > 0. Consider the compiled protocol Cα(Π) for
an arbitrary α > 0, where the commitment scheme is instantiated by a dual-mode commitment
scheme as described above. Then, Cα(Π) is unconditionally secure against dishonest Alice and
computationally secure against dishonest Bob in the CRS model.
We now prove this theorem, which assumes noise-free quantum communication; we explain in
Section 5.1 how to generalize it for a noisy quantum channel. Correctness is obvious. In order
to show unconditional security against dishonest Alice, we notice that the unconditional hiding
property of the commitment scheme ensures that dishonest Alice does not learn any additional
information. Furthermore, as the ideal-life adversary Aˆ′ is not required to be time-bounded
by Definition 3.2, she can break the binding-property of the commitment scheme and thereby
perfectly simulate the behavior of an honest Bob towards Aˆ attacking Cα(Π). The issue of
efficiency of the ideal-life adversaries is addressed in Section 5.3.
As for computational security against dishonest Bob, according to Definition 3.4, we need
to prove that for every real-world adversary B′ ∈ Bpoly attacking Cα(Π), there exists a suitable
ideal-world adversary Bˆ′ ∈ Bpoly attacking F such that
out
Cα(Π)
A,B′
q≈ outF
Aˆ,Bˆ′
.
9 Classically, this would be done by a rewinding argument, but this fails to work for a quantum Bob.
10 The notions of dual-mode cryptosystems and of meaningful/meaningless encryptions, as introduced in [PVW08]
and [KN08], are similar in spirit but differ slightly technically.
11 The proof compares the case where the public key is generated normally to a case where it is chosen with no
relation to any secret key. It is then argued that the assumption implies that the two cases are computationally
indistinguishable, and that in the second case, a ciphertext carries essentially no information about the message.
This argument implies what we need.
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First, note that by the computational indistinguishability of pkH and pkB,
out
Cα(Π)
A,B′ = out
CαpkH(Π)
A,B′
q≈ outC
α
pkB(Π)
A,B′ . (2)
Then, we construct an adversary B′◦ ∈ Bpoly who attacks the unconditional security against
benign Bob of protocol Π, and which satisfies
out
CαpkB(Π)
A,B′ = out
Π
A◦,B
′
◦
, (3)
where A◦ honestly executes Π. We define B
′
◦ in the following way. Consider the execution of
Cα(Π) between A and B′. We split A into two players A◦ and A˜, where we think of A˜ as being
placed in between A◦ and B
′, see Figure 3. A◦ plays honest Alice’s part of Π while A˜ acts as
follows: It receives n qubits from A◦, produces αn/(1 − α) random BB84 qubits of its own
and interleaves them randomly with those received and sends the resulting m = n/(1 − α)
qubits to B′. It then does the verification step of Cα(Π) with B′, asking to have commitments
corresponding to its own qubits opened. If this results in accept, it lets A◦ finish the protocol
with B′. Note that the pair (A◦, A˜) does exactly the same as A; however, we can also move
the actions of A˜ to Bob’s side, and define B′◦ as follows. B
′
◦ samples (pkB, sk) according to
GB and executes Π with A by locally running A˜ and B′, using pkB as CRS. If A˜ accepts the
verification then B′◦ outputs θˆ ∈ {0, 1}n (as required from a benign Bob), obtained by decrypting
the unopened commitments with the help of sk; else, B′◦ aborts at this point. It is now clear
that Equation (3) holds: exactly the same computation takes place in both “experiments”, the
only difference being that they are executed partly by different entities. The last step is to show
that
outΠ
A◦,B
′
◦
s≈ outF
Aˆ,Bˆ′
, (4)
for some Bˆ′. It is clear that the theorem follows from (2) - (4) together.
A◦ A˜ B
′
Π
Cα(Π)
A
B
′
◦
Fig. 3. Constructing an attacker B′◦ against Π from an attacker B
′ against Cα(Π).
Now (4) actually claims that Aˆ, Bˆ′ successfully simulate A◦ and B
′
◦ executing Π, and this
claim follows by assumption of benign security of Π if we show that B′◦ is β-benign according
to Definition 4.1 for any β > 0. We show this in the following subsection, i.e., the joint state
of A◦,B
′
◦ after the preparation phase is statistically indistinguishable from a state ρIdeal which
satisfies the bounds (1) from Definition 4.1.
4.3 Completing the Proof: Bounding Entropy and Memory Size
First recall that A◦ executing Π with B
′
◦ can equivalently be thought of as A executing CαpkB(Π)
with B′. Furthermore, a joint state of A,B′ is clearly also a joint state of A◦,B
′
◦.
To show the existence of ρIdeal as promised above, it therefore suffices to show such a state
for A,B′. In other words, we need to show that the execution of CαpkB(Π) with honest Alice A
and arbitrarily dishonest Bob B′ will, after verification, be close to a state where (1) holds. To
show this closeness, we consider an equivalent EPR-pair version, where Alice creates m EPR
pairs (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2, sends one qubit in each pair to Bob and keeps the others in register
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A. Alice measures her qubits only when needed: she measures the qubits within T in Step 2
of the verification phase, and the remaining qubits at the end of the verification phase. With
respect to the information Alice and Bob obtain, this EPR version is identical to the original
protocol CαpkB(Π): the only difference is the point in time when Alice obtains certain informa-
tion. Furthermore, we can also do the following modification without affecting (1). Instead of
measuring her qubits in T in her basis θ|T , she measures them in Bob’s basis θˆ|T ; however, she
still verifies only whether xi = xˆi for those i ∈ T with θi = θˆi. Because the positions i ∈ T with
θi 6= θˆi are not used in the protocol at all, this change has no effect. As the commitment scheme
is unconditionally binding if key pkB is used, Bob’s basis θˆ is well defined by his commitments
(although hard to compute), even if Bob is dishonest. The resulting scheme is given in Figure 4.
Protocol EPR-CαpkB(Π)
Preparation: A prepares m EPR pairs and sends the second qubit in each pair to Bob while keeping the
others in register A = A1 · · ·Am. B chooses θˆ ∈R {+,×}
m and obtains xˆ ∈ {0, 1}m by measuring the
received qubits in basis θˆ.
Verification: 1. B commits to θˆ and xˆ position-wise: ci : = Commit
`
(θˆi, xˆi), ri
´
with randomness ri for
i = 1, . . . ,m. He sends the commitments to A.
2. A sends a random test subset T ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} of size αm. B opens ci for all i ∈ T . A chooses
θ ∈R {+,×}
m, measures registers Ai with i ∈ T in basis θˆi to obtain xi, and she checks that the
openings were correct and that xi = xˆi whenever θi = θˆi for i ∈ T . If all tests are passed, A accepts,
otherwise, she rejects and aborts the protocol.
3. A measures the remaining registers in basis θ|T¯ to obtain x|T¯ . The tested positions are discarded by
both parties: A and B restrict x and θ, respectively θˆ and xˆ, to the positions i ∈ T¯ .
Post-processing: As in Π (with x, θ, xˆ and θˆ restricted to the positions i ∈ T¯ ).
Fig. 4. EPR version of CαpkB(Π).
We consider an execution of the scheme from Figure 4 with an honest Alice A and a dishonest
Bob B′, and we fix θˆ and xˆ, determined by Bob’s commitments. Let |ϕAE〉 ∈ HA ⊗HE be the
state of the joint system right before Step 2 of the verification phase. Since in the end, we are
anyway interested in the pointwise purification of Bob’s state, we may indeed assume this state
to be pure; if it is not, then we purify it and carry the purifying register R along with E. Clearly,
if B′ had honestly done his measurements then |ϕAE〉 = |xˆ〉θˆ ⊗ |ϕE〉 for some |ϕE〉 ∈ HE. In
this case, the quantum memory E would be empty: H0(|ϕE〉〈ϕE |) = 0. Moreover, X, obtained
by measuring A|T¯ in basis θ|T¯ , would contain dH(θ|T¯ , θˆ|T¯ ) random bits. We show that the
verification phase enforces these properties, at least approximately in the sense of (1), for an
arbitrary dishonest Bob B′.
In the following, rH(·, ·) denotes the relative Hamming distance between two strings, i.e.,
the Hamming distance divided by their length. Recall that T ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} is random subject to
|T | = αm. Furthermore, for a fixed θˆ but a randomly chosen θ, the subset T ′ = {i ∈ T : θi = θˆi}
is a random subset (of arbitrary size) of T . Let the random variable Test describe the choice of
test = (T, T ′) as specified above, and consider the state
ρTestAE = ρTest ⊗ |ϕAE〉〈ϕAE | =
∑
test
PTest(test)|test〉〈test| ⊗ |ϕAE〉〈ϕAE |
consisting of the classical Test and the quantum state |ϕAE〉.
Lemma 4.3. For any ε > 0, xˆ ∈ {0, 1}m and θˆ ∈ {+,×}m, the state ρTestAE is negligibly close
(in m) to a state
ρ˜TestAE =
∑
test
PTest(test)|test〉〈test| ⊗
∣∣ϕ˜testAE〉〈ϕ˜testAE∣∣
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where for any test = (T, T ′): ∣∣ϕ˜testAE〉 = ∑
x∈Btest
αtestx |x〉θˆ|ψxE〉
for Btest = {x ∈ {0, 1}m | rH(x|T¯ , xˆ|T¯ ) ≤ rH(x|T ′ , xˆ|T ′) + ε} and arbitrary coefficients αtestx ∈ C.
In other words, we are close to a situation where for any choice of T and T ′ and for any
outcome x|T when measuring A|T in basis θˆ|T , the relative error rH(x|T ′ , xˆ|T ′) gives an upper
bound (which holds with probability 1) on the relative error rH(x|T¯ , xˆ|T¯ ) one would obtain by
measuring the remaining subsystems Ai with i ∈ T¯ in basis θˆi.
Proof. For any test we let |ϕ˜testAE〉 be the renormalized projection of |ϕAE〉 into the subspace
span{|x〉
θˆ
|x ∈ Btest} ⊗ HE and let |ϕ˜test⊥AE 〉 be the renormalized projection of |ϕAE〉 into the
orthogonal complement, such that |ϕAE〉 = εtest|ϕ˜testAE〉 + ε⊥test|ϕ˜test⊥AE 〉 with εtest = 〈ϕ˜testAE |ϕAE〉
and ε⊥test = 〈ϕ˜test⊥AE |ϕAE〉. By construction, |ϕ˜testAE〉 is of the form required in the statement of the
lemma. A basic property of the trace norm of pure states gives
δ
(|ϕAE〉〈ϕAE |, ∣∣ϕ˜testAE〉〈ϕ˜testAE∣∣) =
√
1− |〈ϕ˜testAE∣∣ϕAE〉|2 = |ε⊥test| .
This last term corresponds to the square root of the probability, when given test, to observe a
string x 6∈ Btest when measuring subsystem A of |ϕAE〉 in basis θˆ. Furthermore, using elementary
properties of the trace norm and Jensen’s inequality gives
δ
(
ρTestAE , ρ˜TestAE
)2
=
(∑
test
PTest(test) δ
(|ϕAE〉〈ϕAE |, ∣∣ϕ˜testAE〉〈ϕ˜testAE∣∣)
)2
=
(∑
test
PTest(test) |ε⊥test|
)2
≤
∑
test
PTest(test) |ε⊥test|2 ,
where the last term is the probability to observe a string x 6∈ Btest when choosing test according
to PTest and measuring subsystem A of |ϕAE〉 in basis θˆ. This situation, though, is a classical
sampling problem, for which it is well known that for any measurement outcome x, the proba-
bility (over the choice of test) that x 6∈ Btest is negligible in m (see e.g. [Hoe63]). ⊓⊔
In combination with Lemma 2.3 on “small superpositions of product states”, and writing h
for the binary entropy function h(µ) = −(µ log(µ) + (1 − µ) log(1 − µ)) as well as using that∣∣{y ∈ {0, 1}n | dH(y, yˆ) ≤ µn}∣∣ ≤ 2h(µ)n for any yˆ ∈ {0, 1}n and 0 ≤ µ ≤ 12 , we can conclude the
following.
Corollary 4.4. Let ρ˜TestAE be of the form as in Lemma 4.3 (for given ε, xˆ and θˆ). For any
fixed test = (T, T ′) and for any fixed x|T ∈ {0, 1}αm with err := rH(x|T ′ , xˆ|T ′) ≤ 12 , let |ψAE〉
be the state to which |ϕ˜testAE〉 collapses when for every i ∈ T subsystem Ai is measured in basis
θˆi and xi is observed, where we understand A in |ψAE〉 to be restricted to the registers Ai with
i ∈ T¯ . Finally, let σE = trA(|ψAE〉〈ψAE |) and let the random variable X describe the outcome
when measuring the remaining n = (1 − α)m subsystems of A in basis θ|T¯ ∈ {+,×}n. Then,
for any subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and any x|I ,12
H∞
(
X|I
∣∣X|I¯ = x|I¯) ≥ dH(θ|I , θˆ|I)− h(err + ε)n and H0(σE) ≤ h(err + ε)n .
Thus, the number of errors between the measured x|T ′ and the given xˆ|T ′ gives us a bound on
the min-entropy of the outcome when measuring the remaining subsystems of A, and on the
max-entropy of the state of subsystem E.
12 Below, θ|I (and similarly θˆ|I) should be understood as first restricting the m-bit vector θ to T¯ , and then
restricting the resulting n-bit vector θ|T¯ to I : θ|I := (θ|T¯ )|I .
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Proof. To simplify notation, we write ϑ = θ|T¯ and ϑˆ = θˆ|T¯ . By definition of ρ˜TestAE, for
any fixed values of ε, xˆ, and θˆ, the state |ψAE〉 is of the form |ψAE〉 =
∑
y∈Y αy|y〉ϑˆ ⊗ |ψyE〉,
where Y = {y ∈ {0, 1}n : dH(y, xˆ|T¯ ) ≤ err + ε}. Consider the corresponding mixture σ˜AE =∑
y∈Y |αy|2|y〉ϑˆ〈y|ϑˆ ⊗ |ψyE〉〈ψyE | and define X˜ as the random variable for the outcome when
measuring register A of σ˜AE in basis ϑ. Notice that H∞(X˜) ≥ dH(ϑ, ϑˆ) since any state |y〉ϑˆ,
when measured in basis ϑ, produces a random bit for every position i with ϑ 6= ϑˆ. Lemma 2.3
allows us to conclude that H∞(X) ≥ H∞(X˜)− log |Y| ≥ dH(ϑ, ϑˆ)− h(err+ ε)n and H0(σE) ≤
log |Y| ≤ h(err + ε)n. This proves the claim for I = {1, . . . , n}. For arbitrary I ⊂ {1, . . . , n}
and x|I , we can consider the pure state obtained by measuring the registers Ai with i 6∈ I in
basis ϑi when x|I¯ is observed. This state is still a superposition of at most |Y| vectors and thus
we can apply the exact same reasoning to obtain (1). ⊓⊔
The claim to be shown now follows by combining Lemma 4.3 and Corollary 4.4. Indeed, the
ideal state ρIdeal we promised is produced by putting A and B
′ in the state ρ˜TestAE defined in
Lemma 4.3, and running Steps 2 and 3 of the verification phase. This state is negligibly close
to the real state since by Lemma 4.3 we were negligibly close to the real state before these
operations. Corollary 4.4 guarantees that (1) is satisfied.
5 Extensions and Generalizations
5.1 In the Presence of Noise
In the description of the compiler Cα and in its analysis, we assumed the quantum communi-
cation to be noise-free. Indeed, if the quantum communication is noisy honest Alice is likely to
reject an execution with honest Bob. It is straightforward to generalize the result to noisy quan-
tum communication: In Step 2 in the verification phase of Cα(Π), Alice rejects and aborts if the
relative number of errors between xi and xˆi for i ∈ T with θi = θˆi exceeds the error probability
φ induced by the noise in the quantum communication by some small ε′ > 0. By Hoeffding’s
inequality [Hoe63], this guarantees that honest Alice does not reject honest Bob except with
exponentially small probability. Furthermore, proving the security of this “noise-resistant” com-
piler goes along the exact same lines as for the original compiler. The only difference is that
when applying Corollary 4.4, the parameter err has to be chosen as err = φ + ε′, so that (1)
holds for β = h(err+ε) = h(φ+ε′+ε) and thus the claim of Theorem 4.2 hold for any β > h(φ)
(by choosing ε, ε′ > 0 small enough). This allows us to generalize the results from the Section 6
to the setting of noisy quantum communication.
5.2 Bounded-Quantum-Storage Security
In this section we show that our compiler preserves security in the bounded-quantum-storage
model (BQSM). In this model, one of the players (Bob in our case) is assumed be able to
store only a limited number of qubits beyond a certain point in the protocol. BQSM-secure OT
and identification protocols are known [DFR+07,DFSS07], but they can be efficiently broken
if the memory bound does not hold. Therefore, by the theorem below, applying the compiler
produces protocols with better security, namely the adversary needs large quantum storage and
large computing power to succeed.
Consider a BB84-type protocol Π, and for a constant 0 < γ < 1, let Bγbqsm(Π) be the set
of dishonest players B′ that store only γn qubits after a certain point in Π, where n is the
number of qubits sent initially. Protocol Π is said to be unconditionally secure against γ-BQSM
Bob, if it satisfies Definition 3.3 with the restriction that the quantification is over all dishonest
B
′ ∈ Bγbqsm(Π).
Theorem 5.1. If Π is unconditionally secure against γ-BQSM Bob, then Cα(Π) (for an 0 <
α < 1) is unconditionally secure against γ(1−α)-BQSM Bob.
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Proof. Exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4.2, given dishonest Bob B′ attacking Cα(Π), we con-
struct dishonest Bob B′◦ attacking the original protocol Π. The only difference here is that we let
B
′
◦ generate the CRS “correctly” as pkH sampled according to GH. It follows by construction of
B
′
◦ that out
Cα(Π)
A,B′ = out
Π
A◦,B
′
◦
. Also, it follows by construction of B′◦ that if B
′ ∈ Bγ(1−α)bqsm (Cα(Π))
then B′◦ ∈ Bγbqsm(Π), since B′◦ requires the same amount of quantum storage as B′ but communi-
cates an α-fraction fewer qubits. It thus follows that there exists Bˆ′ such that outΠ
A◦,B
′
◦
s≈ outF
Aˆ,Bˆ′
.
This proves the claim. ⊓⊔
5.3 Efficient Simulation
The security definitions we use here are clearly closely related to the UC-security concept in that
they require a protocol to implement a certain functionality, and that this can be demonstrated
via a simulation argument. However, our definitions do not imply UC-security. For this we would
need all simulators to be efficient, and our definition of unconditional security against dishonest
Alice does not require this (unlike the definition of computational security against Bob).
Of course, it might still be the case that our compilation preserves efficiency of the simulator,
namely if protocol Π is secure against dishonest Alice with efficient simulator Aˆ′, then so is
Cα(Π).
Although this would be desirable, it does not seem to be the case for our basic construc-
tion: In order to show such a result, we would need to simulate the preprocessing phase against
dishonest A′ efficiently and without measuring the qubits that are not “opened during” prepro-
cessing. Once this is done, we can give the remaining qubits to Aˆ′ who can simulate the rest of
the protocol.
However, the whole point of the preprocessing is to ensure that Bob measures all qubits,
unless he can break the binding property of the commitments, so the only hope is to bring
the simulator in a situation where it can make commitments and open them any way it wants.
The standard way to do this is to give the simulator some trapdoor information related to the
common reference string, that Bob would not have in real life. Indeed, with such a trapdoor
commitment scheme, simulation of the preprocessing is trivial: We just wait until Alice reveals
the bases and the test subset, measure qubits in the test subset, and open the commitments
according to the measurement results.
While no such trapdoor is known for the commitment scheme we suggested earlier, it is
possible to extend the construction efficiently to build in such a trapdoor:
To do this, we need a new ingredient, namely a relation R representing a hard problem, and
a Σ-protocol for R. The relation is a set of pairs R = {(u,w)} where u can be thought of as
a problem instance and w as the solution. The relation is hard if one can efficiently generate
(u,w) ∈ R such that from u one cannot in polynomial time compute w such that (u,w) ∈ R. We
need that R is hard even for quantum algorithms. We also need that there is a Σ-protocol, i.e.
an honest verifier perfect zero-knowledge interactive proof of knowledge where a prover shows,
on input u, that he knows w such that (u,w) ∈ R. Protocol conversations have form (a, b, z)
where the prover sends a, the verifier gives a random challenge bit b and the prover sends z. It
is required that, given conversations (a, 0, z0), (a, 1, z1) that the verifier would accept, one can
compute w such that (u,w) ∈ R.
As an example, one can think of u = (G0, G1) where G0, G1 are isomorphic graphs and
w is an isomorphism. The Σ- protocol is just the well-known standard zero-knowledge proof
for graph isomorphism. There are several plausible and practically more useful examples, see
[DFS04].
Given this, and a commitment scheme with public key pkH as described above, we build a
new commitment scheme as follows: the public key is u, pkH. To commit to a bit b, the committer
runs the honest verifier simulator to get a conversation (a, b, z). The commitment is now a, c0, c1,
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where cb = Commit(z, r) and c1−b = Commit(0, r
′). To open a commitment, one reveals b and
opens cb. The receiver checks that (a, b, z) is accepting and that cb was correctly opened.
By perfect honest verifier zero-knowledge and perfect hiding of commitments based on pkH,
the new commitment is perfectly hiding. However, if one knows w such that (u,w) ∈ R, one
can compute (a, 0, z0) and (a, 1, z1) both of which are accepting conversations, and set c0 =
Commit(z0, r0), c1 = Commit(z1, r1), and it is now possible to open both ways. Hence w serves
as the trapdoor we need for efficient simulation above.
The new commit scheme still has the property we need for the compilation, namely one can
choose the public key in a different but indistinguishable way, such that the committed bit can
be extracted: we let the public key be u, pkB, where pkB is a binding public key for our original
scheme. Now, given a commitment (a, c0, c1), we can decrypt c0, c1 to see which of them contains
a valid reply in the Σ-protocol. The only way we can fail to predict how the commitment can
be opened is if both c0 and c1 contain valid replies. But this would imply that the committer
can compute w, so for a polynomial-time bounded committer, this only happens with negligible
probability, since the relation is assumed to be hard.
5.4 Doing without a Common Reference String
We can get rid of the CRS assumption by instead generating a reference string from scratch using
a coin-flip protocol. In [DL09], such a coin-flip protocol is described and proved secure against
quantum adversaries using Watrous’ quantum rewinding method [Wat06]. Note that for our
compiler, we want the CRS to be an unconditionally hiding public key, and when using Regev’s
cryptosystem, a uniformly random string (as output by the coin-flip) does indeed determine
such a key, except with negligible probability.
6 Applications
6.1 Oblivious Transfer
We discuss a protocol that securely implements one-out-of-two oblivious transfer of strings of
length ℓ (i.e. 1-2 OTℓ). In 1-2 OTℓ, the sender A sends two l-bit strings s0 and s1 to the receiver
B. B can choose which string to receive (sk) but does not learn anything about the other one
(s1−k). On the other hand, A does not learn B’s choice bit k. The protocol is almost identical
to the 1-2 OT1 introduced in [BBCS91], but uses hash functions instead of parity values to
mask the inputs s0 and s1. The resulting scheme, called 1-2 QOT
ℓ, is presented in Figure 5,
where F denotes a suitable family of universal hash functions with range {0, 1}ℓ (as specified
in [DFR+07]). We assume that ℓ = ⌊λn⌋ for some constant λ > 0.
Protocol 1-2 QOTℓ :
Preparation: A chooses x ∈R {0, 1}
n and θ ∈R {+,×}
n and sends |x〉
θ
to B, and B chooses θˆ ∈R {0, 1}
n and
obtains xˆ ∈ {0, 1}n by measuring |x〉
θ
in basis θˆ.
Post-processing: 1. A sends θ to B.
2. B partitions all positions 1 ≤ i ≤ n in two subsets according to his choice bit k ∈ {0, 1}: the “good”
subset Ik := {i : θi = θˆi} and the “bad” subset I1−k := {i : θi 6= θˆi}. B sends (I0, I1) to A.
3. A sends descriptions of f0, f1 ∈R F together with m0 := s0 ⊕ f0(x|I0) and m1 := s1 ⊕ f1(x|I1).
4. B computes sk = mk ⊕ fk(xˆ|Ik ).
Fig. 5. Protocol for String OT.
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Theorem 6.1. Protocol 1-2 QOTℓ is unconditionally secure against β-benign Bob for any β <
1
8 − λ2 .
Proof. Let F
OT
ℓ be the ideal oblivious transfer functionality. For any given benign Bob B′, we
construct Bˆ′ the following way. Bˆ′ runs locally a copy of B′ and simulates Alice by running A up
to but not including Step 3. After the preparation phase, Bˆ′ gets θˆ since B′ is benign. When the
simulation of A reaches the point just after the announcement of f0 and f1 in Step 3, Bˆ
′ finds
k′ such that dH(θˆ|Ik′ , θ|Ik′ ) is minimum for k′ ∈ {0, 1}. Bˆ′ then calls FOTℓ with input k′ and
obtains output sk′ . Bˆ
′ sets m′k′ = sk′ ⊕ fk′(x|Ik′ ) and m′1−k′ ∈R {0, 1}ℓ before sending (m0,m1)
to B′. Bˆ′ then outputs whatever B′ outputs.
We now argue that the state output by Bˆ′ is statistically close to the state output by B′ when
executing 1-2 QOTℓ with the real A. The only difference is that while Bˆ′ outputsm′1−k′ ∈R {0, 1}ℓ,
B
′ outputs m1−k′ = s1−k′ ⊕ f1−k′(x|I1−k′ ). To conclude, we simply need to show that m1−k′ is
statistically indistinguishable from uniform from the point of view of B′. Note that since θ and
θˆ are independent and θ is a uniform n-bit string, we have that for any ǫ > 0, dH(θ, θˆ) >
(1 − ǫ)n/2, except with negligible probability. It follows that with overwhelming probability
dH(θ|I1−k′ , θˆ|I1−k′ ) ≥ (1−ǫ)n/4. Since B′ is β-benign, we have that H∞
(
X|I1−k′
∣∣X|Ik′ = x|Ik′) ≥
(1− ǫ)n/4−βn and H0(ρE) ≤ βn which implies, from privacy amplification, that f1−k′(x|I1−k′ )
is statistically indistinguishable from uniform for B′ provided ℓ
n
< 14 − 2β − ǫ for any ǫ > 0. We
conclude that m1−k′ is statistically close to uniform. ⊓⊔
By combining Theorem 6.1 with Theorem 4.2, and the results of [DFR+07] (realizing that
the same analysis also applies to 1-2 QOTℓ) with Theorem 5.1, we obtain the following hybrid-
security result.
Corollary 6.2. Let 0 < α < 1 and λ < 18 . Then protocol Cα(1-2 QOTℓ) is computationally secure
against dishonest Bob and unconditionally secure against γ(1−α)-BQSM Bob with γ < 14 − 2λ.
6.2 Password-Based Identification
We want to apply our compiler to the quantum password-based identification scheme from [DFSS07].
Such an identification scheme allows a user A to identify herself to server B by means of a com-
mon (possibly non-uniform and low-entropy) password w ∈ W, such that dishonest A′ cannot
delude honest server B with probability better then trying to guess the password, and dishonest
B
′ learns no information on A’s password beyond trying to guessing it and learn whether the
guess is correct or not.
In [DFSS07], using quantum-information-theoretic security definitions, the proposed iden-
tification scheme was proven to be unconditionally secure against arbitrary dishonest Alice
and against quantum-memory-bounded dishonest Bob. In [FS09] it was then shown that these
security definitions imply simulation-based security as considered here, with respect to the func-
tionality FID given in Figure 6.13
Functionality FID: Upon receiving wA, wB ∈ W from user Alice and from server Bob, respectively, FID
outputs the bit y := (wA
?= wB) to Bob. In case Alice is dishonest, she may choose wA =⊥ (where ⊥ 6∈ W).
For any choice of wA the bit y is also output to dishonest Alice.
Fig. 6. The Ideal Password-Based Identification Functionality.
13 Actually, the definition and proof from [DFSS07] guarantees security only for a slightly weaker functionality,
which gives some unfair advantage to dishonest A′ in case she guesses the password correctly; however, as
discussed in [FS09], the protocol from [DFSS07] does implement functionality FID.
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We cannot directly apply our compiler to the identification scheme as given in [DFSS07],
since it is not a BB84-type protocol. The protocol does start with a preparation phase in which
Alice sends BB84 qubits to Bob, but Bob does not measure them in a random basis but in a
basis determined by his password wB ∈ W; specifically, Bob uses as basis the encoding c(wB)
of wB with respect to a code c : W → {+,×}n with “large” minimal distance. However, it
is easy to transform the original protocol from [DFSS07] into a BB84-type protocol without
affecting security: We simply let Bob apply a random shift κ to the code, which Bob only
announces to Alice in the post-processing phase, and then Alice and Bob complete the protocol
with the shifted code. The resulting protocol QID is described in Figure 7, where F and G
are suitable families of (strongly) universal hash functions (we refer to [DFSS07] for the exact
specifications). It is not hard to see that this modification does not affect security as proven
in [DFSS07] (and [FS09]).
Protocol QID :
Preparation: A chooses x ∈R {0, 1}
n and θ ∈R {+,×}
n and sends |x〉θ to B, and B chooses θˆ ∈R {0, 1}
n and
obtains xˆ ∈ {0, 1}n by measuring |x〉
θ
in basis θˆ.
Post-processing: 1. B computes a string κ ∈ {+,×}n such that θˆ = c(w)⊕ κ (we think of + as 0 and × as
1 so that ⊕ makes sense). He sends κ to A and we define c′(w) := c(w)⊕ κ.
2. A sends θ and f ∈R F to B. Both compute Iw := {i : θi = c
′(w)i}.
3. B sends g ∈R G.
4. A sends z := f(x|Iw )⊕ g(w) to B.
5. B accepts if and only if z = f(xˆ|Iw )⊕ g(w).
Fig. 7. Protocol for Secure Password-Based Identification
Theorem 6.3. If the code c : W → {+,×}n can correct at least δn errors in polynomial-time
for a constant δ, then protocol QID is unconditionally secure against β-benign Bob for any β < δ4 .
Proof. For any given benign Bob B′, we construct Bˆ′ as follows. Bˆ′ runs locally a copy of B′ and
simulates Alice’s actions by running A faithfully except for the following modifications. After
the preparation phase, Bˆ′ gets θˆ and κ from B′ and attempts to decode θˆ ⊕ κ. If this succeeds,
it computes w′ such that c(w′) is the decoded codeword. Otherwise an arbitrary w′ is chosen.
Then, Bˆ′ submits w′ as Bob’s input wB to FID and receives output y ∈ {0, 1}. If y = 1 then Bˆ′
faithfully completes A’s simulation using w′ as w; else, Bˆ′ completes the simulation by using a
random z′ instead of z. In the end, Bˆ′ outputs whatever B′ outputs.
We need to show that the state output by Bˆ′ (respectively B′) above is statistically close to
the state output by B′ when executing QID with real A. Note that if w′ = wA, then the simulation
of A is perfect and thus the two states are equal. If w′ 6= wA then the simulation is not perfect:
the real A would use z = f(x|IwA ) ⊕ g(wA) instead of random z′. It thus suffices to argue that
f(x|Iw) is statistically close to random and independent of the view of B′ for any fixed w 6= w′.
Note that this is also what had to be proven in [DFSS07], but under a different assumption,
namely that B′ has bounded quantum memory, rather than that he is benign; nevertheless, we
can recycle part of the proof.
Recall from the definition of a benign Bob that the common state after the preparation phase
is statistically close to a state for which it is guaranteed that H∞(X|I) ≥ dH(θ|I , θˆ|I)− βn for
any I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, and H0(ρER) ≤ βn. By the closeness of these two states, switching from
the real state to the “ideal” state (which satisfies these bounds) has only a negligible effect on
the state output by Bˆ′; thus, we may assume these bounds to hold.
Now, if decoding of θˆ ⊕ κ succeeded, it is at Hamming distance at most δn from c(w′).
Since the distance from here to the (distinct) codeword c(w) is greater than 2δn, we see that
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θˆ ⊕ κ is at least δn away from c(w). The same is true if decoding failed, since then θˆ ⊕ κ is at
least δn away from any codeword. It follows that c′(w) = c(w) ⊕ κ has Hamming distance at
least δn from θˆ. Furthermore, for arbitrary ε > 0 and except with negligible probability, the
Hamming distance between θ|Iw = c′(w)|Iw and θˆ|Iw is at least essentially (δ/2−ε)n. Therefore,
we can conclude that H∞(X|Iw) ≥ (δ/2− ε− β)n and H0(ρER) ≤ βn. But now, if such bounds
hold such that H∞(X|Iw)−H0(ρER) is positive and linear in n, which is the case here by the
choice of parameters, then we can step into the proof from [DFSS07] and conclude by privacy
amplification [RK05] that z is close to random and independent of E. This finishes the proof. ⊓⊔
By combining Theorem 6.3 with Theorem 4.2, and the results of [DFSS07] with Theorem 5.1,
we obtain the following hybrid-security result.
Corollary 6.4. Let 0 < α < 1 and |W| ≤ 2νn. If the code c : W → {+,×}n can correct δn
errors for a constant δ > 0 in polynomial-time, then protocol Cα(QID) is computationally secure
against dishonest Bob and unconditionally secure against γ(1−α)-BQSM Bob with γ < δ2 − ν.
Families of codes as required in these results, correcting a constant fraction of errors efficiently
and with constant information rate are indeed known, see [SS96].
In the next section, we briefly discuss how to obtain hybrid security against man-in-the-
middle attacks by means of incorporating the techniques used in [DFSS07] to obtain security in
the BQSM against such attacks.
6.3 Protecting against Man-in-the-middle Attacks
The compiled quantum protocols from Sections 6.1 and 6.2 protect against (arbitrary) dishonest
Alice and against (computationally or quantum-storage bounded) dishonest Bob. However, in
particular in the context of identification, it is also important to protect against a man-in-the-
middle attacker, Eve, who attacks an execution of the protocol with honest parties A and B
while having full control over the classical and the quantum communication. Both, QID and
Cα(QID), are insecure in this model: Eve might measure one of the transmitted qubits, say, in
the + -basis, and this way learn information on the basis θˆi used by B and thus on the password
w simply by observing if B accepts or rejects in the end.
In [DFSS07] it was shown how to enhance QID in order to obtain security (in the bounded-
quantum-storage model) against man-in-the-middle attacks. The very same techniques can also
be used to obtain hybrid security against man-in-the-middle attacks for Cα(QID). The techniques
from [DFSS07] consist of the following two add-on’s to the original protocol. (1) Checking of
a random subset of the qubits in order to detect disturbance of the quantum communication;
note that Cα(QID) already does such a check, so this is already taken care of here. And (2)
authentication of the classical communication. This requires that Alice and Bob, in addition to
the password, share a high-entropy key k that could be stored, e.g., on a smart-card. This key
will be used for a so-called extractor MAC which has the additional property, besides being a
MAC, that it also acts as an extractor, meaning if the message to be authenticated has high
enough min-entropy, then the key-tag pair is close to randomly and independently distributed.
As a consequence, the tag gives away (nearly) no information on k and thus k can be re-used
in the next execution of the protocol.14
Concretely, in order to obtain hybrid-security against man-in-the-middle attacks for Cα(QID),
A will, in her last move of the protocol, use an extractor MAC to compute and send to B an
authentication tag, computed on all the classical messages exchanged plus the string x|Iw .
This tag, together with the qubit checks, prevents Eve from interfering with the (classical
and quantum) communication without being detected, and security against Eve essentially
14 This is in contrast to the standard way of authenticating the classical communication, where the authentication
key can only be used a bounded number of times.
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follows from the security against impersonation attacks. Note that including the x|Iw into the
authenticated message guarantees the necessary min-entropy, and as such the re-usability of the
key k.
We emphasize that the protocol is still secure against impersonation attacks (i.e. dishonest
Alice or Bob) even if the adversary knows k. We omit formal proofs since they literally follow
the corresponding proofs in [DFSS07].
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A Sequential Composition Theorem for Computational Security
In this appendix, we show that our new Definition 3.4 of computational security allows for
sequential composability in a classical environment. In order to state the composition theorem,
we need to define what we mean by running a quantum protocol in a classical environment.
Again, we give here a brief summary of the setting from [FS09] and refer the interested reader
to the original article for further details.
A classical two-party oracle protocol15 ΣF1···Fℓ = (Aˆ, Bˆ) between Alice and Bob is a pro-
tocol which makes a bounded number k of sequential oracle calls to possibly different ideal
functionalities F1, . . . ,Fℓ.
For the oracle protocol to be classical, we mean that it has classical in- and output (for the
honest players), but also that all communication between Alice and Bob is classical.16 Consider
a dishonest player, say Bob, and consider the common state ρUjV ′j at any point during the
execution of the oracle protocol when a call to functionality Fi is made. The requirement for
the oracle protocol to be classical is now expressed in that there exists a classical Zj—to be
understood as consisting of Bˆ′’s classical communication with Aˆ and with the Fi′ ’s up to this
point—such that given Zj, Bob’s quantum state V
′
j is not entangled with Alice’s classical input
and auxiliary information: ρUjZjV ′j = ρUj↔Zj↔V ′j . Furthermore, we require that we may assume
Zj to be part of V
′
j in the sense that for any Bˆ
′ there exists Bˆ′′ such that Zj is part of V
′
j . This
definition is motivated by the observation that if Bob can communicate only classically with
Alice, then he can entangle his quantum state with information on Alice’s side only by means
of the classical communication.
We also consider the protocol we obtain by replacing the ideal functionalities by quantum
two-party sub-protocols π1, . . . , πℓ with classical in- and outputs for the honest parties: whenever
ΣF1···Fℓ instructs Aˆ and Bˆ to execute FiAˆ,Bˆ, they instead execute πi and take the resulting
outputs. We write Σπ1···πℓ = (A,B) for the real quantum protocol we obtain this way.
We recall that in order to define computational security against a dishonest Bob in the
common-reference-string model, we considered a polynomial-size quantum circuit, called input
sampler, which takes as input the security parameter m and the CRS ω (chosen according
to its distribution) and which produces the input state ρUZV ′ ; U is Alice’s classical input to
the protocol, and Z and V ′ denote the respective classical and quantum information given
to dishonest Bob. We require from the input sampler that ρUZV ′ = ρU↔Z↔V ′ , i.e., that V
′ is
correlated with Alice’s part only via the classical Z. When considering classical hybrid protocols
Σπ1···πℓ in the real world, where the oracle calls are replaced with quantum protocols using a
common reference string, it is important that every real protocol πi uses a separate instance (or
part) of the common reference string which we denote by ωi.
15 In [FS09], the more standard term hybrid protocol is used, but as this term is used differently in this paper,
we avoid it here in the context of composability.
16 We do not explicitly require the internal computations of the honest parties to be classical.
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Theorem A.1 (Sequential Composition). Let ΣF1···Fℓ = (Aˆ, Bˆ) be a classical two-party
oracle protocol which makes at most k = poly(n) oracle calls to the functionalities, and for
every i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, let protocol πi be a computationally secure implementation of Fi against
Bpoly.
Then, for every real-world adversary B′ ∈ Bpoly who accesses the common reference string
ω = ω1, . . . , ωk there exists an ideal-world adversary Bˆ
′ ∈ Bpoly who does not use ω such
that for every efficient input sampler, it holds that the outputs in the real and ideal world are
q-indistinguishable, i.e.
outΣ
π1···πℓ
A,B′
q≈ outΣF1···Fℓ
Aˆ,Bˆ′
Note that we do not specify what it means for the oracle protocol to be secure; Theorem A.1
guarantees that whatever the oracle protocol achieves, an indistinguishable output is produced
by the real-life protocol with the oracle calls replaced by protocols. But of course in particular,
if the oracle protocol is secure in the sense of Definition 3.4, then so is the real-life protocol:
Corollary A.2. If ΣF1···Fℓ is a computationally secure implementation of G against Bpoly, and
if πi is a computationally secure implementation of Fi against Bpoly for every i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ},
then Σπ1···πℓ with at most k = poly(n) oracle calls is a computationally secure implementation
of G against Bpoly.
The following proof is an adaptation of the sequential-composability proof in the information-
theoretical setting given in [FS09].
Proof (of Theorem A.1). Consider a dishonest B′ ∈ Bpoly. We prove the claim by induction on
k. If no oracle calls are made, we can set Bˆ′ := B′ and the claim holds trivially. Consider now
a protocol ΣF1···Fℓ with at most k > 0 oracle calls. For simplicity, we assume that the number
of oracle calls equals k, otherwise we instruct the players to makes some “dummy calls”. Let
ρUkZkV ′k be the common state right before the k-th and thus last call to one of the sub-protocols
π1, . . . , πℓ in the execution of the real protocol Σ
π1,...,πℓ. To simplify notation in the rest of the
proof, we omit the index k and write ρU¯Z¯V¯ ′ instead; see Figure 8. We know from the induction
hypothesis for k−1 that there exists an ideal-world adversary Bˆ′ ∈ Bpoly not using the common
reference string such that ρU¯ Z¯V¯ ′
q≈ σU¯Z¯V¯ ′ where σU¯ Z¯V¯ ′ is the common state right before the k-th
call to a functionality in the execution of the oracle protocol ΣF1···Fℓ
Aˆ,Bˆ′
ρUZV ′ . As described at the
begin of this section, U¯ and Z¯, V¯ ′ are to be understood as follows. U¯ denotes A’s (respectively
Aˆ’s) input to the sub-protocol (respectively functionality) that is to be called next. Z¯ collects
the classical communication dictated by ΣF1...,Fℓ as well as Bˆ′’s classical inputs to and outputs
from the previous oracle calls and V¯ ′ denotes the dishonest player’s current quantum state.
Note that the existence of Z¯ is guaranteed by our formalization of classical oracle protocols and
σU¯ Z¯V¯ ′ = σU¯↔Z¯↔V¯ ′ .
Let ωi be the common reference string used in protocol πi. For simplicity, we assume that
the index i, which determines the sub-protocol πi (functionality Fi) to be called next, is fixed
and we just write π and F for πi and Fi, respectively.
It follows from Definition 3.4 of computational security that there exists Bˆ′ ∈ Bpoly (in-
dependent of the input state) not using ωi such that the corresponding output states σX¯Z¯Y¯ ′
and τX¯Z¯Y¯ ′ produced by FAˆ,Bˆ′ (as prescribed by the oracle protocol) and πA,B′ run on the state
σU¯ Z¯V¯ ′ = σU¯↔Z¯↔V¯ ′ are q-indistinguishable.
The induction step is then completed as follows.
outΣ
π
A,B′ = ρX¯Z¯Y¯ ′ = (πA,B′) ρU¯ Z¯V¯ ′
q≈ (πA,B′)σU¯ Z¯V¯ ′ = σX¯Z¯Y¯ ′
q≈ τX¯Z¯Y¯ ′ = outΣ
F
Aˆ,Bˆ′
Note that the strategy of Bˆ′ does not depend on the state σU¯ Z¯V¯ ′ , and hence, the overall ideal-
world adversary Bˆ′ does not depend on the input state either. Furthermore, the concatenation
of two polynomially bounded players is polynomially bounded, i.e. Bˆ′ ∈ Bpoly.
⊓⊔
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pii pii
pii′ Fi′
Fi
Fi′
≈
≈
Σ
π1···πℓ
AB′
Σ
F1···Fℓ
AˆBˆ′
ρ
U¯ Z¯V¯ ′
σX¯Z¯Y¯ ′ τX¯Z¯Y¯ ′ρX¯Z¯Y¯ ′
σU¯ Z¯V¯ ′
Fig. 8. Steps of the Composability Proof
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